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Abstract. Bitcoin has, since 2009, become an increasingly popular on-
line currency, in large part because it resists regulation and provides
anonymity. We discuss how Bitcoin has become both a highly useful
tool for criminals and a lucrative target for crime, and argue that this
arises from the same essential ideological and design choices that have
driven Bitcoin’s success to date. In this paper, we survey the landscape
of Bitcoin-related crime, such as dark markets and bitcoin theft, and
speculate about possible future possibilities, including tax evasion and
money laundering.
1 Introduction
Bitcoin emerged in 2009 with the aim to provide a secure and independent cur-
rency alternative to the global financial infrastructure, which has seen massive
downturns and scandals in recent years. In the words of Bitcoin creator, Satoshi
Nakamoto:
“The root problem with conventional currency is all the trust that’s required
to make it work. The central bank must be trusted not to debase the currency,
but the history of fiat currencies is full of breaches of that trust. Banks must be
trusted to hold our money and transfer it electronically, but they lend it out in
waves of credit bubbles with barely a fraction in reserve. We have to trust them
with our privacy, trust them not to let identity thieves drain our accounts. Their
massive overhead costs make micropayments impossible.” [1]
To realise this libertarian agenda, Bitcoin was envisaged as a trustless decen-
tralized network where all transactions are cryptographically verified by users
and recorded in a decentralized ledger. This ledger, the blockchain, is populated
by miners who compete in a lottery-style contest. So far the Bitcoin experiment
has been very successful in certain respects: users have ownership over their
wealth, third parties cannot manipulate currency creation, transaction fees are
very low, and users can achieve a certain measure of anonymity.
These factors contributed to a surge in Bitcoin’s popularity after the Cyprus
banking crisis where the government authorized banks to impose losses on share-
holders and large depositors. Bitcoin, trading at US$40 rose to US$200 as a
result, and shortly after, soaring Chinese demand pushed it up further, at one
point past the US$1000 mark. Bitcoin prices now hover around the $350 mark
[2], and the current market cap is at $4.7 billion [3]. Bitcoin is also gaining
traction with vendors. Prominent brands such as Dell, WordPress, Paypal and
Microsoft now offer Bitcoin payment options [4] and Bitcoin payment processors,
such as Coinbase and BitPay, are seeing record growth and expansion. However,
Bitcoin has also received substantial negative press due to its role in powering
dark markets such as Silk Road. High-profile hacks of Bitcoin exchanges have
resulted in thefts of hundreds of thousands of coins belonging to customers.
In this paper, we argue that these negatives should essentially be understood
as the flip side of Bitcoin’s key strengths, its ephemeral, trustless and distributed
nature. We survey the range of Bitcoin-related criminal activity, such as dark
markets, online extortion, malware, and theft, and highlight how these threats
derive from the same fundamental qualities that have thus far also defined Bit-
coin’s success. We observe that this criminal activity is growing rapidly, becoming
increasingly diverse and sophisticated, and presenting us with a variety of new
ethical and legal dilemmas.
Many of these issues were not foreseen by the Bitcoin community, and we
anticipate more will emerge as adoption increases. Visualizing these threats as
a natural consequence of Bitcoin’s ideology and design choices also allows us
to speculate about future threats before they occur. We discuss distinct future
possibilities such as tax evasion, money laundering, and esoteric scenarios where
the Bitcoin P2P network itself may be exploited for criminal activity.
In conclusion, we observe that this ideological conflict within Bitcon is likely
the reason that proposed solutions to these threats are falling short.
2 Bitcoin and Crime
We begin by describing how Bitcoin has triggered a boom in online black markets
by effectively ‘de-risking’ illegal transactions.
2.1 Dark Markets
Silk Road: Silk Road was an anonymous online drug market, accessible to
the general public from July 2011 [5]. A combination of technologies, including
Bitcoin, were used to protect anonymity with the goal that the identity of sellers
would be protected absolutely, whereas buyers would need to provide sellers
with a physical shipping address for the product. If law enforcement officers
infiltrated the site as sellers they may be able to obtain addresses for buyers,
but no information about sellers (a higher value target) other than what may be
leaked from the content of the seller’s communications or the packaging of the
shipment.
Silk Road was only accessible as a TOR hidden service [6], thereby prevent-
ing users from discovering the IP address of the site, and also preventing outside
observers from discovering that a particular user had accessed the site. Payments
were made using Bitcoin, thereby preserving anonymity of all parties, and an
escrow service was provided to give buyers more confidence in their dealings
[7]. The site also provided advice on how to package drugs to bypass common
detection methods, and the site owners actively encouraged community discus-
sion about the quality of sellers and related customer experiences. The website
interface and user experience was modelled on the pattern of legitimate online
marketplaces, such as eBay and Amazon. In testimony to its success, Silk Road
was widely acknowledged as the ‘eBay of drugs’ [8], making it “easier and faster
to order drugs than it is to order a pizza” [9], and raking in an estimated annual
revenue of $1.2 billion.
Dark Markets go Mainstream: Silk Road was shut down by the FBI in Oc-
tober 2013 after the arrest of the alleged owner of the site. Silk Road 2.0 was
launched soon after and then shut down [10], and currently a Silk Road 3.0 site
is available. However, there has been a massive surge in the number of sites
selling drugs online using the Silk Road model, and the overall effect is that
even the online drugs marketplace has now, in a sense, become decentralized.
Researchers at the Digital Citizens Alliance [11] note that when Silk Road was
taken down, there were four dark markets dominating the landscape and to-
talling about 18,000 drug listings. A year later, in October 2014, a dozen large
markets accounted for some 32,000 drug listings, alongside a significant increase
in advertisements for other illicit goods such as weapons. There is now even a
dedicated Google-style search engine [12] which allows buyers to compare listings
across multiple dark markets.
Since these sites exist as TOR hidden services, their addresses can be publicly
posted. This not only makes them easy to find for the novice Internet user but
also allows users to post reviews of suppliers on public message boards. This
has bizarrely enough resulted in a situation where customer service and product
quality are now key differentiators between drug suppliers. Customers openly
discuss their experiences with different suppliers on public forums. Some even
post results of chemical tests they have performed on the product they purchase.
This new phenomenon also raises complex new challenges for existing drug
laws. Online customers are usually unaware of the location from which drugs
will be shipped, and even when they are aware, this may be less of a consider-
ation than testimonials of good customer service and drug purity. However, in
many countries the laws prescribe harsher penalties for the import of prohibited
drugs than they do for possession. Likewise, when buying drugs online with high
packaging costs, it may be economical for suppliers to offer larger quantities
at discounts, and for buyers to make larger and less frequent purchases. This
may result in prosecution of those who buy drugs for personal use under laws
intended to target suppliers [9].
De-risking Crime: Analyzing Silk Road in greater detail, researchers Aldridge
and Dcary-Htu contend that these “cryptomarkets” are a “paradigm shifting
criminal innovation” in that, by facilitating anonymous virtual transactions,
they overcome the dangerous physical limitations of the drug trade, effectively
de-risking the enterprise [7]. Physical drug deals are known to put the purchaser
at an increased risk of violent crime [13], especially if they require the individual
to deal with people from a culture where they do not understand cultural norms
of behaviour [14]. Purchasing drugs online using Bitcoin as per the dark market
business model and receiving them in the mail eliminates the need for users to
visit drug dealers in person and is therefore much safer. This contrast is graph-
ically highlighted if one considers the lifestyle of alleged Silk Road mastermind
Ross Ulbricht [15]. Ulbricht was arrested at a local public library, in the science
fiction section where he would oversee Silk Road’s daily operations on his laptop
using the library’s public WiFi. This is a far cry from the stereotypical image
of a typical drugs broker, running a billion dollar empire, and surrounded by
bodyguards and hitmen.
Expanding on this theme, Infante speculates that the use of Silk Road may
even have reduced incidences of death and other harm associated with cross-
border drug smuggling . He estimates some 1,200 deaths potentially related to
drug-violence may have been prevented over the course of the three years that
Silk Road was in operation [16].
2.2 Theft and Malware
We next examine how Bitcoin’s global reach has opened up new opportunities
for online theft, extortion, and triggered a massive upsurge in malware.
Hacking Bitcoin Exchanges: Unlike traditional currencies, bitcoins exist
exclusively as virtual assets and transactions, once made, are irreversible. This
makes Bitcoin a fair target for hackers and scammers. Sophisticated attacks on
Bitcoin exchanges, the cryptocurrency equivalent of bank heists, are now com-
mon. The MtGox saga has received significant media coverage. In February 2014,
MtGox, the largest Bitcoin exchange in the world at the time, handling approx-
imately 80% of all Bitcoin transactions, was allegedly hacked (or the victim of
some other kind of fraud) and shut down shortly after [17]. 850,000 bitcoins be-
longing to customers were stolen, with a value of more than half a billion dollars.
This significantly impacted user confidence in Bitcoin, which was correlated with
a drop in Bitcoin value.
The list of Bitcoin exchanges and wallet services that have been successfully
hacked and driven to collapse also includes names such as Bitcoinca, BitFloor,
Flexcoin, Poloniex and Bitcurex. In a paper on the topic, researchers Tyler Moore
and Nicolas Christin quantify the risks and hazards associated with Bitcoin ex-
changes and note that of 40 Bitcoin exchanges established recently, 18 soon shut
down [18]. Several hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of customers’ coins
were stolen or lost in these incidents. Some of these sites were guilty of poor
security design and practices, but it is also believed that hacks are becoming
increasingly sophisticated. At the time of writing another incident involving the
BitStamp exchange has been announced with 5 million dollars in losses [19].
Malware: Researchers from Dell recently reported [20] that 146 strains of mal-
ware have thus far been discovered that are designed to steal bitcoins from
victims’ computers. Around 50% of these successfully bypass most antiviruses.
This count is up from 13 such strains discovered in 2012 and the rate of malware
creation has loosely tracked the surge in Bitcoin exchange rate. These mal-
ware search victims’ machines for common wallet formats to steal their private
keys. Some advanced variants are equipped with keyloggers to target password-
protected wallets. Yet another strain switches Bitcoin addresses on the fly when
users’ copy an address to the clipboard while making payments, replacing them
with the malware owner’s address, thereby diverting the payment to him [21].
Ransomware: In 2004, Young and Yung first suggested the idea of a virus that
encrypts data on victims’ computers using an asymmetric cipher and holds it
hostage for ransom [22]. The decryption key is not embedded in the virus code-
base, so the attack cannot be reverse-engineered. However, ransom payments
had to traverse the traditional financial infrastructure which risked exposing the
owner of the malware and therefore this scheme had limited appeal. However,
Bitcoin’s anonymity, independence of centralized authorities, and global acces-
sibility makes it the ideal solution.
As a result, ransomware is now thriving. CryptoLocker, a ransomware tro-
jan which demanded payment in bitcoins, was first observed in September 2013.
CryptoLocker claimed 250,000 victims and earned an estimated $30 million in
just 100 days [23]. It has since then spawned an entire family of malware. A vari-
ant, CryptoWall, infected over 600,000 systems in the past six months, holding
5 billion files hostage, earning attackers more than US $1 million. CryptoWall
even infected the systems of official government departments. The office of the
Dickson County Sheriff in the US paid the ransom in full to decrypt their archive
of case files. Durham Constabulary in the UK has refused [24].
In a recent blogpost, researchers at McAfee Labs point out that this class
of ransomware is now being crowdsourced. Tox [25] is a free and easy-to-deploy
ransomware kit that ‘customers’ can download from a website and use to deliber-
ately infect computers belonging to others. Tox uses TOR and Bitcoin, it resists
typical malware detection tools, and can be customized, prior to installation, as
to the amount of ransom the malware charges. The Tox website tracks all instal-
lations and charges 20% of any claimed ransoms. The authors note that other
classes of malware may soon incorporate this crowdsourcing and profit-sharing
model.
Bitcoin Mining: Malware have also been discovered which covertly mine cryp-
tocurrencies on victims’ machines. These malware either mine independently or
participate in public or dark mining pools, connecting either directly or through
proxies [26]. Customized malware builds have also been found for smartphones,
webcams, and even network storage devices. One botnet successfully utilized
network attached storage devices over a two month period to mine $600,000
worth of Dogecoin, a Bitcoin inspired alt-currency [27].
However, in the case of Bitcoin, mining malware is no longer proving a prof-
itable venture given the increased block difficulty level and the rise of mining
pools, and some commercial botnets which offered mining services (such as Ze-
roAccess) have now stopped offering mining as a service.
3 Future Threats
Here, we briefly consider some hypothetical examples of criminal activity which
derives directly from Bitcoin’s anonymous and trustless nature. We observe that
Bitcoin’s lack of regulation facilitates tax evasion and money laundering. We
also consider esoteric threats which use the Bitcoin P2P network.
Tax Evasion: In a panel discussion recently [28], when asked about Bitcoin
enabling tax evasion, Princeton’s Edward Felten commented: “You could argue
that [Bitcoin] does [make it easier to avoid taxes] because it’s a transaction that
doesn’t involve the banking system.” However, he downplayed the risk: “The
conspiracy to not report income has to be too large in a sizeable company, and
the consequences of getting caught [for] the leaders are too large.”
While this may be true for large corporations, it is not very difficult at the
individual level to evade taxes. Due to the economic downturn, there is already a
growing trend in underreporting taxes. Tens of millions of ordinary people, peo-
ple who are not career criminals but instead nannies, fitness teachers, barbers,
construction workers, etc. are increasingly participating in the shadow economy
and working off the books. In 2013, economist Edgar Feige estimated that there
was an estimated 2 trillion dollar gap in what Americans reported to the IRS
- a huge sum when compared to a 385 billion dollar estimate by the IRS in
2006 [29]. This trend might increase: 30% of Americans today are self-employed
and some predict this figure will rise to 50% by 2020 [30]). There is no way of
knowing if income is taxable unless the recipient voluntarily reports it, and this
growing freelance economy may prove very hard to track if they start transacting
in Bitcoin.
Tax Havens and Money Laundering: There is also an ongoing discus-
sion about Bitcoin functioning as a tax haven and its use in money laundering.
Traditionally, tax evasion or money laundering would require criminals to di-
vert funds through a complex financial maze involving multiple actors such as
banks, shell companies, and offshore accounts. Governments in recent years have
found it more effective not to target offshore tax havens directly, but to coop-
erate with foreign governments and attack links in the financial infrastructure,
namely banks. A good example of this trend is the US Foreign Account Tax
Compliance Act (FACTA) which targets tax cheats by requiring foreign banks
to directly report to the US Internal Revenue Service about financial accounts
held by US taxpayers [31]. Failure to do so exposes the bank to the risk of being
penalized on its earnings from American investments.
However, Bitcoin, with its pseudonymity, its ephemerality, and its total inde-
pendence of the banking infrastructure defeats this entire strategy. All that is
required to successfully hide or launder funds with Bitcoin is a series of private
anonymized transactions. There already exist ‘laundry’ services and tumblers
which accept bitcoins from multiple sources and mix them in a way that the link
between input and output addresses is broken.
Money laundering may not be an immediate threat due to Bitcoin’s lim-
ited usage and high price volatility, but researchers have started to sound the
alarm [32, 33]. The US government has applied money laundering rules to virtual
currencies [34] and Europol, the EU law enforcement agency handling criminal
intelligence, has requested greater policing powers [35] to meet this challenge.
Exploiting the Bitcoin Network: New research has shown that it is pos-
sible to exploit Bitcoin for non-payment purposes, such as timestamping data
[36, 37] or building advanced financial services [38]. Likewise, we believe, threats
will emerge which do not involve the currency but which use the underlying
Bitcoin network. Some attacks have already been practically demonstrated.
Interpol has recently warned that the Bitcoin blockchain can serve as a vehicle
for malware and illegal content [39]. In a demo at the Black Hat Asia conference,
researcher Vitaly Kamluk, showed how a hacker may embed malicious payloads
in the blockchain where it could be retrieved by malware on remote machines.
In a similar vein, researchers have demonstrated that the Bitcoin P2P network
can function as a reliable low-latency command-and-control (C&C) infrastruc-
ture to power botnets [40]. In existing botnets, C&C commands from the bot-
master are typically delivered to bots over IRC networks, custom P2P protocols,
or via HTTP sites. These communication channels are also therefore the botnet’s
key vulnerability, and allows security researchers and law enforcement to expose
the botmaster and disrupt C&C communications.
In the case of Bitcoin-based C&C communications, the botmaster embeds
commands in legitimate Bitcoin transactions using a variety of mechanisms (such
as the transaction OP-RETURN field, subliminal channels, unspendable out-
puts, etc.) which are then dispatched over the Bitcoin network where bots may
receive them. This has several advantages, most notably that it is far more ro-
bust and secure than current C&C methods. Disrupting C&C transactions in
this case would not only violate the ideology Bitcoin was built upon, but it
would likely impact legitimate Bitcoin users and significantly affect network us-
ability as a whole. Botmasters also stand to benefit from greater anonymity and
less risk using the Bitcoin network for C&C communications.
4 Discussion
As we observe from this brief overview of Bitcoin-related criminal activity, cur-
rent and future, Bitcoin’s strengths and weaknesses both derive from the same
essential ideological and architectural design choices. For this reason, we believe
there are no easy solutions to the problems we have discussed so far. Anonymity
and lack of regulation which is meant to free users from central authorities also
empowers drug dealers and money launderers. Denoting money as virtual assets
to remove reliance on banks also opens the doors to hackers and malware. Set-
ting up a global financial network exposes unwitting users to threats from all
over the world and opens up a Pandora’s box of ethical and legal issues.
This is akin to the Tor dilemma. Tor is much hyped as a platform provid-
ing Internet access to citizens living in the shadow of repressive regimes, but
it is equally well known as the communication medium of choice for hackers
and supports a thriving underground economy and trade in illicit pornography.
There is no technological mechanism to disentangle these two usage scenarios.
In supporting Tor, we implicitly acknowledge that the positive applications of
the network justify the negative. This deadlock leaves us with questions: What
now? Is it worth trying to fix Bitcoin? Can it even be fixed?
Several solutions are being developed which try to address some of the cur-
rency’s problems. Online wallet services (such as Coinbase) aim to protect and
simplify management of users’ Bitcoin credentials. Hardware wallets (such as
Trezor and BTChip) are available which store user credentials in protected hard-
ware which is mostly kept offline. Multi-signature escrow services have been pro-
posed for consumer protection (such as Bitrated.com) which allow for arbitration
over disputes. Multisignature wallet services (such as CryptoCorp) propose to
use fraud detection algorithms to co-sign user transactions to protect them from
scammers and malware. Researchers are working on ‘coin-tainting’ techniques
[41] to identify and track illegal transactions and clustering techniques to iden-
tify single ownership of groups of Bitcoin addresses.
However, none of these solutions decisively solve our problems. Some, ironi-
cally, even suggest a return to the regulated centralized framework that Bitcoin
originally rebelled against. As we have learnt from the experience of WiFi, it
would be unrealistic to expect the majority of people today to protect Bitcoin
addresses and wallets from sophisticated hackers and malware. Online wallet ser-
vices and multisignature facilities, much like banks, take away the key elements
of anonymity and privacy, as they are privy to all user transactions. Depending
on which part of the world these services are based in, governments may even be
able to regulate them via legislation. The same applies for companies like Coin-
Base and Bitpay which act as a conversion portal between Bitcoin users and
traders/merchants who accept traditional currencies. These companies could be
subject to regulation which might negatively interfere with the customer expe-
rience.
Researchers have also questioned the strategy of tainting suspect bitcoins as
a crimefighting technique [42]. Blacklisting certain coins will reduce their value,
making them harder to spend, and this ultimately stands to have a destabilizing
effect on the currency as a whole.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that Bitcoin has become both a useful tool for criminals and a
target for crime. Furthermore, the desirability of Bitcoin for criminals derives
directly from its anonymity and freedom from central regulation, otherwise de-
sirable properties that the Bitcoin network was designed to provide.
We believe this fundamental paradox at the heart of Bitcoin is the reason
why Bitcoin-related crime is rapidly growing and diversifying. As we observe, the
trends show a marked increase in the mainstream proliferation of dark markets,
a surge in Bitcoin-related malware, and a growing number of attacks on Bitcoin
exchanges. Our analysis also provides a useful perspective to reason about future
criminal possibilities, such as tax evasion and money laundering. This may also
include non-financial applications, such as hijacking the Bitcoin network for illicit
communications.
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